When I moved back to Kurdistan in early September of last year one of the first things I did was put a piece of paper on the wall of my flat with four of five place names listed; Akre, Amedi, Soran, Rawanduz.
Places I was aware of or had been to briefly, but did not know in detail. The list grew as I learned about more hidden gems; Gara, Alqosh, the Dereluk Pools and others.
One night when researching other lesser known “attractions” and corners of Kurdistan, I came across a report about something called the Bekhme Dam Project.
Unlike the better known Mosul Dam, a poorly completed project that has been internationally monitored ever since the Gulf War invasion of 1991, the Bekhme Dam was abandoned with only the initial stages of the project having begun.
My interest was piqued. The fact that few maps could pinpoint its exact location aside from generally stating and showing that it was within the Behkmal Gorge only made it more intriguing.
Northern Iraq is littered with examples of abandoned, failed, or poorly designed public works and civil engineering projects. Of the failed/abandoned/poorly designed paradigm, Mosul Dam is probably the most famous and an example of the last.
It is increasingly making international news, with initial design flaws and poor construction now presenting a both immediate and long-term threat.
The dam was built upon a foundation of limestone, a notoriously porous and weak rock prone to dissolution, responsible for things such as massive sink holes in Florida and the famous cenotes of the Yucatan peninsula in southeastern Mexico.
Bekhme Dam, however, is much different. A massive dam that was abandoned soon after beginning, and consequently poorly mapped to the public online domain.
A more ambitious project, and one that has seemed to disappear from local consciousness.
The dam was planned for a final height of a staggering 230 meters (over 750 feet tall), comparable to the Hoover Dam. A gargantuan undertaking in any sense.
A few weeks ago I took a long weekend in Erbil to visit friends. It was a fun weekend and one that I know I need to do more often.
My route back was one of the things I was most looking forward to, a series of winding roads that took me back to Duhok with an extra 100km of road and beautiful vistas.
It was a perfect route, taking me through many of the different landscapes of Kurdistan; dusty plains, rolling hills, snowy passes and sheer mountain faces.
About four hours into my ride I came upon the mouth of the Bekhmal Gorge. Rising suddenly from low rolling hills, the canyon is so daunting that a road has never been carved all the way through it unlike the Rawanduz Canyon, forty kilometers to the east and far better known than Bekhmal probably because it can be traversed much easier.
The Bekhmal Gorge is the product of the Zab River, the largest river within Iraqi Kurdistan, with a watershed extending well into southern Turkey and with many smaller tributaries such as the Rawanduz River.
At the mouth of the gorge stood a small Peshmerga checkpoint. I could tell by the soldiers’ cautious and puzzled expressions that few people ever came through. I was surprised that there was a checkpoint at all, as checkpoints only exist at points where there is thru-traffic.
They let me pass with minimal questioning and I rode into the canyon.
The cliff walls climbed immediately, and within a kilometer I was surrounded by 3,000ft vertical drops. The river below was powerful and the water a shockingly translucent light blue.
I got off my bike and just stood laughing for a moment. I couldn’t believe I’d found myself in what is probably the most beautiful canyon I’ve yet seen in Kurdistan, with not another soul around.
The road wound past narrow cliffs and within only a few kilometers I could see the other opening, where the cliff walls faded to the Sapna Valley.
At the far terminus of the vertical face I could see deep cuts and grooves carved into the mountain tracing a gargantuan triangle several hundred feet tall.
Having seen similar cuts in northern and southern California I knew immediately I was looking at what remained, or what was ever accomplished of the Bekhme Dam.
I hopped off again, on a narrow bluff overlooking the river. A small herd of goats were sharing the cliff with me, grazing on a small patch of grass. They didn’t mind my presence in the slightest. No one else was anywhere in sight or nearby, so I guessed they were wild.
Beyond, the deep triangular cuts rose high above me, with a series of tunnels drilled perpendicular to the rock face. I could see the road continued, climbing to the mountain face and coming to a dead end at the entrance of one such tunnel.
While I stood staring I heard a car’s rumble behind me on the road. From the direction it was coming it could only have come from the tunnel where the road ended. I walked over and only then realized the tunnel had been bored clear-through, with distant sunlight peeking from the far side.
The tunnel was well below the highest cuts of the dam’s outline, and at a pitch of maybe 6- 8%. It was obviously not designed for traffic of any kind, being completely unpaved, uneven and steep, but as a release once the dam was complete and near capacity.
The temptation was of course too much, so I rode through.
Light struggled to illuminate the tunnel, and water seeped from the walls and ceiling. The light from my bike cast moving shadows on the uneven walls of the tunnel.
Where water trickled down the walls the changing shadows seemed almost life like , and with no one else around it caused the unshakeable feeling that something was with me, or following me, through the tunnel.
When I reached the other side I was in the Sapna Valley, on a small dirt access road. I could see its connection to the narrow two-lane paved road a few kilometers and several hundred feet below me.
A truck with two sheep rolled past on the gravel road. The tunnel had become something of a locals-only shortcut since the dam had been abandoned, and the earlier checkpoint must have been in place to monitor the few people who used it.
When I returned to Duhok I did some more much-needed research. Although the project was overly ambitious, there had to be very specific reasons as to why the dam was abandoned.
The obvious reason seemed to be the displacement of the local populace. And as I hoped, that the process of inundating one of the most beautiful (albeit generally unknown) valleys of Kurdistan was enough to dissuade the dam’s completion.
Another possible reason seemed to be that the dam and resulting reservoir would have forever erased several important archaeological sites.
Much of the historical heritage of the region is already at great risk, and the prospect of purposefully destroying several more sites might have been a reasonable point of opposition to the dam’s completion.
A little bit of research brought out many more, often muddled answers.
The dam was initially planned in the 1950’s but not begun until the late 1970’s when it was postponed shortly after due to the onset of the Iran-Iraq war.
The project was then renewed in the late 1980’s only to be postponed again and essentially abandoned only 2 years later with the Gulf War and Kurdish Uprising (1).
In the last decade the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) has expressed interest in renewing the project once more, and small progress has been made.
However, the Bekhme Dam is still meeting a fair number of hurdles.
Baghdad has refused to support the project after a widespread regional drought in 2008. The Zab is the largest single tributary to the Tigris, and heavily regulating it’s flow and release in the far north of Iraq would greatly restrict downstream water access to the roughly 30million people that live in the Tigris-Euphrates flood plain south of the dam (2).
There are geologic concerns as well, with the dam lying above a possible dormant fault. If true, it could require significant more research as to the potential of a resultant earthquake and its effect on a completed dam.
A minor earthquake would certainly be plausible after, or if the dam were completed, as such occurrences have happened in previous situations where bedrock sometimes shifts due to the change in stress levels caused by a reservoir’s presence (3).
In addition, the historical heritage angle is true as well. The Sapna Valley was preliminarily mapped over half a century ago for archaeological sites, but has never been thoroughly studied due to regional volatility. In known threat are the ancient village of Zawi Chemi Shanidar, dated to the 11th century BCE with evidence of inhabitants as recently as about 500 CE, in addition to Shanidar Cave, a Stone Age site, as well as numerous ancient monasteries and synagogues (4).
As a result, a dam that has been twice postponed and once abandoned now seems destined to remain in continual project purgatory. The current economic state of the KRG would make it seem highly unlikely that the project is rebooted anytime soon.
So many other current issues far outstrip the dam’s priority, and what will realistically be a mammoth price tag will continue to act as a deterrent for a government very short on cash.
Unless any dramatic changes happen in the near future, the project will remain only a skeletal foundation, some deep bore holes, an eerie local shortcut through a weeping mountain, and a mostly unknown attraction, much like Kurdistan itself.
- Kehreman, Berevan. “Envirozan Report 1: Bekhme Dam.” 2006. https://web.archive.org/web/20110721200314/http://www.envirozan.info/EZ_Docs/Dams/Bexme_Dam_Report.pdf. 9 March 2016.
- “Shared Tributaries of the Tigris River.” UN-ESCWA and BGR (United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia; Bundesanstalt für
Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe). 2013. Inventory of Shared Water Resources in Western Asia. Beirut. http://waterinventory.org. 14 March 2016.
- Ameen, Bakhtiar, and Kamal H Karim. “Qamchuqa and Bekhme contact.” 2008. http://kurdistan-geology.com. 6 March 2016.
Solecki, Ralph S. “The Bekhme dam project in Kurdistan Iraq: a threat to the archaeology of the upper Zagros river valley.” 2005. https://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-135732901.html. 15 March 2016.
17 thoughts on “Iraq’s Hoover Dam That Never Was”
Fascinating research, Dawson. I’m glad it wasn’t completed, because the scenery is so beautiful! You could write a book.
Merrie, I could write a book! A was there from the end of 1986. till we were ordered to live the site in 1990. The road tunnel was really a fascinating one! But could you imagine the main underground works with its 14- and 16-metre wide tunnels and underground halls as large as football fields, that my company did?
Thanks for the added info. I’ve had a lot of unanswered q’s about the dam project… I can’t believe someone who worked on the project found my post! How long were you out there? Where are you now?
There were two main contractors for the project: the (then) Yugoslav company HIDROGRADNJA of Sarajevo, and Turkish ENKA. The Yugoslavs were doing all the huge underground works – that they almost completed, but the Turks have never completed the rock-fill dam – not to their fault. I was a mechanical engineer, working for the Yugoslav company, responsible for the operation and maintenance of the construction equipment and plants. Just about the road tunnel: It was designed for road traffic! But why it was left unpaved and unlined? (All the big tunnels – parts of the hydro-electric scheme – were lined!) During the construction period it was used also for 2-way traffic of 4-metre wide dump trucks. There were also a lot of (temporary!) water, air and electrical lines installed along its sides. Any lining would obviously reduce its width, making it impossible for the 2-way traffic of large vehicles! Of course, the road pavement and the concrete lining were included in the final design, making it the standard 7-metre wide road tunnel!
Yes, but that was almost 30 years ago! Here are some ‘general’ informations about me and some specifics of the job: I was a ‘senior’ mechanical engineer, responsible – as my managers instructed me – for ‘everything that runs or rotates’ at the site! Actually, a sort of ‘technical assistant’ to the chief mechanical engineer, the big boss! It was an unusual arrangement for my company, but I was authorized to issue orders to all the other managers of various sectors ((the workshop, diesel-generator station (six Ruston diesels of 4,000 kVA each), tunneling equipment group, crushing and screening plant, concrete batching plant, mobile equipment, etc.)), as I was recognized as the best mechanical engineer in HIDROGRADNJA at the time. The project was really very big – our portion was a half of the total value of 1,7 billion US$ (of 1886!) – and important, the total value of our plants and equipment was almost 100 million US$. Earlier, during 1986. I was a part of the team in our head office in Sarajevo, negotiating with the suppliers of various sorts of equipment: Caterpillar, Atlas-Copco, Volvo, Liebherr, etc. Once the contracts were signed with them, at the end of 1986., I went to the site to check the delivery and other contractual obligations of the suppliers. The work was organized in three 8-hour shifts, 6 days a week, although we were doing some specific jobs even on Fridays. Altogether, there were about 2,300 of us – construction workers, drivers, operators, mechanics, cooks, etc. Beside the size and technical complexity of the job, there was also another very important factor of its success: the security arrangements! At that time there was a sort of active war between the Kurds and the Iraqi army! The whole area (the camp and the site) was encircled with a high barbed-wire fence and there were a hundred or so Iraqi soldiers protecting us. As I said, half of the project (the dam itself) was contracted to the Turkish company of ENKA. The authorities were much more concerned about the safety of Turkish people there – with the prolonged war between the Kurds and Turkey. The Kurds would kill any Turk that they had a chance to catch. We, the Yugoslavs, were really very popular with both the Arabs and Kurds – due to the non-aligned policy of Tito and Yugoslavia – and with our fair relations with the locals we felt safe! The access to the site was organized in two convoys daily – between the site and city of Erbil – with the armed escort of the Iraqi Army. Unscheduled stops were not allowed, any vehicle broken down was to be abandoned, passengers quickly transferred to other vehicles (there was always a spare capacity). During the night the Army withdrew to their bases (very similar to medieval fortresses!), they were afraid to travel even with their armoured personel carriers, and any abandoned vehicle was either taken by Kurds or burned down. Even our buses were equipped with non-standard heavy-duty drawbar couplings at their front and rear – the drivers were trained to quickly install a drawbar and an air line between a good vehicle and that broken down and – for example, in the event of engine failure – the convoy moved on within minutes. And then in 1990. Iraqi Army invaded Kuwait, the Army concentrated to the south and left the Kurdish area, and as the whole project was left without any protection, we were ordered to leave and go home with our personel belongings only. All the equipment was to be left at the site. We really (and naively!) had thought we might have been back within several months! We replaced oil and filters on the engines, put all the vehicles and machines into the tunnels, put them on wooden blocks (to relieve load from the tyres), and closed the tunnels with rocks for a 100 meters or so from each entrance. Later we learned that the Kurds had removed all the obstacles and were starting to destroy the equipment inside the tunnels! But it lasted just a couple of days: then the Iranians – who were helping Iraqi Kurds in their struggle against Iraqi authorities – bought nearly all the equipment from the Kurds! We were informed that for several years our trucks were working on some construction projects in Iran! (The equipment suppliers were receiving orders for spare parts from Iran – and they recognized the chassis numbers supplied as those belonging to the equipment sold to Hidrogradnja!) Then another disaster struck my company (and my country!): the war erupted in former Yugoslavia, especially in Bosnia at the beginning of 1992. But at the end of summer in 1991. my company sent me to another jobsite in Libya – instead of just one year, as planned, I stayed there for 4 years. With the Dayton Agreement bringing peace to Bosnia, I returned to Sarajevo, but then I learned that my company was heading fast to its bankcruptcy. Then the Crown Agents of UK opened a large workshop in Sarajevo – servicing and repairing vehicles belonging to SFOR troops (the US and British units were our best customers!), newly-openned embassies, humanitarian organizations, TV and press teams, etc. As the Aftersales Manager I stayed with the British for 5 years, when they left Bosnia. Then I joined Scania organization in Bosnia for another 5 years, and finally I spent some two and half years with Volvo Trucks in Sarajevo as well. Now I am a happily retired engineer, enjoying my memories. Yes Dawson, here is only a ‘small’ part of my story that I will never put in a book! Should you have any questions, just put them on! And not to forget to tell you: I spent about 6 years (1976-1982.) working on the Hemren Dam Project, some 130 km north-east from Baghdad and some 25 km from the Iraq-Iran border/frontline! And the war was going on there! Well, us coming from the then non-aligned country of Yugoslavia and having good relations with the nearly all countries of the ‘Third World’, the Iranian authorities had told our government they would never do any harm to us! But that is another story!
Amazing Petar. Thank you for the insight. I’m sure if you ever wanted to, you could put down a fantastic book. Are you back in Sarajevo now?
Yes, I’m now enjoying a snowy- yet not so cold – winter in Sarajevo… and remembering the 1977. summer at Hemren Dam Project with the temperatures of up to +54 degC (in shade!). What a beautiful weather there…
Love Sarajevo. One of my favorite cities anywhere. I make it to Croatia quite frequently to visit family, and have been to BiH two times as well; one of the most beautiful countries in the world!
Yes, the country and the people are very nice, but our politicians… But, but, but!!! I was born in city of Osijek, north-eastern Croatia (region named Slavonia, near Hungarian border) – and my heart is still there! This is the (almost) flat region of the country, wide plains, no high mountains, wide streets, living in the center of the city, the wide Drava river with passenger and freight boats, etc. While I was a child – 60 years ago, my family moved to Sarajevo – with mountains that seemed like Himalayas to me, moving to a flat at an outskirt of the city, narrow streets, a narrow and shallow river (named Miljacka),… Thou I have no friends or relatives in Osijek now, almost every year I go there, to spend just a few hours walking around. When I went into retirement – 10 years ago, I thought I might be moving back to Osijek. Of course, I never did it – just sweet memories, nothing else!
Been to much of Croatia, but very little of Slavonia and never to Osijek. Next time I make it to Sarajevo we should get a coffee, I’d love to hear some other stories!
Some more details on the (temporary) traffic arrangements thru the road tunnel: We were very careful when specifying our equipment – we wanted our dumptrucks capable of being used for both the open-cast and underground works. That’s why we bought 40 pcs. of Volvo 442C trucks that were of very compact design and we used them also for excavation of all the big tunnels and underground halls. Of course, it was also possible to use them for the two-way traffic thru the road tunnel. The Turks however bought the Komatsu trucks (of the same capacity!), that were much wider than our Volvos. Yes, their main purpose was the open-cast excavation. So, when they wanted to send a Komatsu thru the tunnel, they put their people at the both ends of the tunnel with two-way radios, their job was stopping any other truck (standard or wide) from entering the tunnel – until the Komatsu was out! Although the Komatsus were of the more modern design, with more powerful engines and higher (theoretical!) speed, our fleet of smaller Volvos has had the higher transport capacity (tons per hour) then the larger Komatsus! Also, the open roads for Volvos must not be wider that 10 m, while the Komatsus needed about 12 m. Two meters wider cuttings in the hard-rock mountain side cost a lot of money, believe me!
Hi Petar, next time I’m in Sarajevo- whenever that may be- it would be great to sit down and hear all about your experiences working on the project as well as in northern Iraq. You’ve got some very interesting stories and I’d love to hear it all.
Petar, a dam half as tall, would still hold 70% of the water as this old gargantua. It would also NOT drown Shanidar and a majority of the archaeological site. Just a down-sizing the dam and satisfy most every concern–for water, abundance of hydro-electricity, preservation of (most historic sites), and a cornucopia of agriculture below the dam. ONE big concern, however, is earthquakes–big earthquakes–a common phenomenon in the area
For Dan (comment on Aug. 29, 2018): I am a mechanical engineer, very familiar with was donethere between 1987. and 1990, so I have no my personal opinion what would bethe best solution for a ‘lower dam’. But, first of all, a deep river valley âin vertical plane – looks like an inverted triangle with the surface of thelower half much smaller than the upper half. So, how it can hold 70% of theoriginal volume? However, there are some drawings from a study made by aBelgrade (Srbia) consulting company upon the request from the Iraqi Governmentfor a new design.
First of all, the study offered two solutions for the damitself: 1) Rolled-concrete dam, and 2) Rockfill dam. The concrete dam mayinclude a new spillway structure, but the rockfill one not â for the evacuationof flood waters the bottom outlet and diversion tunnels (with necessarymodifications) must be used. With either of the two new solutions, with a lowerdam the existing spillway tunnels will have to be abandoned.
The study analyzed two alternatives for the new dam: max. waterlevels at 550 or 517 m above sea level (ASL) â see the two lower pictures. (Theoriginal MWL was set at 599 m ASL!) With the 517 m water level there would be practicallyno useful storage, the power plant then will operate as a run-of-the-river typeand it will be almost impossible to provide a regular water flow for thedownstream agricultural areas â that is a must for the central government! Forthe power generation, from the original 1,500 MW it will be lowered to 840 MWand 380 MW respectively. So the study recommended that the new dam shall offerthe 550 m max. water level.
But, here is the politics again: the regional Kurdishauthorities are divided in what new solution to adapt? Â The ‘550 m dam’, although it is the onlyviable economical alternative, shall flood dozens of villages inhabited by oneof the very influental family. But all of them want as much electricity aspossible. The central government will refuse to finance the ‘517 m dam’ (andwill do everthing to prevent it!), the ‘regionals’ have no money to do anythingat Bekhme! So the whole idea is still at standstill!
Best regards, Petar
For Dan (his comment on Aug. 29, 2018): I am a mechanical engineer, very familiar with was done there between 1987. and 1990, and I have no personal opinion what would be the best solution for a ‘lower dam’. But, first of all, a deep river valley – in vertical plane – looks like an inverted triangle with the surface of the lower half much smaller than the upper half. So, how it can hold 70% of the original volume? However, there are some drawings in a study
Click to access hidraulicki.pdf
made by a Belgrade (Srbia) consulting company upon the request from the Iraqi Government for a new design (unfortunately, it is in Serbian, but look at the drawings ‘Slika 2.’ ans ‘Slika 4.’)
First of all, the study offered two solutions for the dam itself: 1) Rolled-concrete dam, and 2) Rockfill dam. The concrete dam may include a new spillway structure, but the rockfill one not – for the evacuation of flood waters the bottom outlet and diversion tunnels (with necessary modifications) must be used. With either of the two new solutions, with a lower dam the existing spillway tunnels will have to be abandoned.
The study analyzed two alternatives for the new dam: max. water levels (MWL) at 550 or 517 m above sea level (ASL) – see the two lower pictures – ‘Slika 4.’. (The original MWL was set at 599 m ASL!) With the 517 m water level there would be practically no useful storage, the power plant then will operate as a run-of-the-river type and it will be almost impossible to provide a regular water flow for the downstream agricultural areas – that is a must for the central government! For the power generation, from the original 1,500 MW it will be lowered to 840 MW and 380 MW respectively. So the study recommended that the new dam shall offer the 550 m max. water level.
But, here is the politics again: the regional Kurdish authorities are divided in what new solution to adapt? The ‘550 m dam’, although it is the only viable economical alternative, shall flood dozens of villages inhabited by one of the very influental family. But all of them want as much electricity as possible. The central government will refuse to finance the ‘517 m dam’ (and will do everthing to prevent it!), the ‘regionals’ have no money to do anything at Bekhme! So the whole idea is still at a standstill!
Best regards, Petar